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COURT DEBATES TWIST TO SPECIES ACT AT ISSUE
Property Rights vs. Endangered Animals
The Phoenix Gazette
Monday, April 17, 1995
Richard Carelli
The Associated Press
In what may be the most important environmental
case it has heard in nearly two decades, the Supreme
Court debated today whether the Endangered Species
Act bans destruction of wildlife habitats on private
property.
During spirited arguments, Justice Antonin Scalia
said that extending the law to bans on logging on
private lands "seems to me just weird."
But Justice Stephen Breyer said he disagreed with
a narrow interpretation of the law that would find
private landowners in violation of the act only when
they purposely harmed a protected species.
Justice Clarence Thomas was the only court
member who refrained from questioning the lawyers
who appeared before the high court.
The justices must decide whether landowners
violate the 1973 law if they change the natural homes
of endangered or threatened species.
A federal appeals court ruled last year that the law
bars only direct threats such as hunting, trapping or
otherwise directly killing the species, but not indirect
threats such as destruction of habitat.
That ruling, in an Oregon dispute over protection
of the Northern spotted owl, was hailed as one of the
timber industry's greatest legal victories.
Environmentalists called it a grave threat to the
Endangered Species Act's continued effectiveness.
Scalia suggested the so-called "taking" of fish and
wildlife prohibited by the law should not be extended
to include logging or other habitat modification.
"To 'take' an animal refers to hunters.
Historically, I've never heard it used in any other
way," Scalia said.
"The whole spotted owl thing is based on that
notion that people who harvest trees are taking owls.
To say this is taking an animal seems to me just
weird."
Breyer said he didn't read the law to require
intentional harm. He suggested it might apply as well
when "the person knows it is going, as a consequence,
to kill a few rare birds."
Breyer said a farmer who set up a battery of guns
to kill crows eating the farmer's corn - and knew the
guns also could kill rare birds in the vicinity - should
be held responsible for deaths of the rare birds.
"I don't see how Congress could pass the act and
not prohibit the person who, for other reasons, is
shooting guns off and happens to wipe out the
species," Breyer said.
Justice David Souter agreed.
"It seems to me you're wrong when you say it's
got to be purposeful," he said.
Potentially millions of acres in the Pacific
Northwest could be affected by the court's ruling.
Endangered species battles also are being waged on
hundreds of millions of acres of privately owned land
in other parts of the country.
A congressional report said that 90 percent of the
781 endangered or threatened species listed by the
government in 1993 have habitats on privately owned
land.
Supporters and critics of the Endangered Species
Act agree that the court's ruling, to be announced by
late June, could eclipse in importance the high court's
1978 decision that said Congress intended to protect
endangered species "whatever the cost."
The Endangered Species Act makes it a crime to
"take" any endangered species, and by regulation that
prohibition is applied as well to threatened species.
The law defines "take" to mean "to harass, harm,
pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture or
collect."
The case attracted the most unsolicited advice of
any during the court's 1994-95 term, a total of 24
frend-of-the-court bri4Mes were. filed.
Among those urging the justices to uphold the
appeals court ruling are the states of Arizona,
California, Kansas, Nebraska and Utah.
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BRUCE BABBITT, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, et al., PETITIONERS
V.
SWEET HOME CHAPTER OF COMMUNITIES FOR A GREAT OREGON et al.
No. 94-859
Supreme Court of the United States
115 S.Ct. 2407
Argued April 17, 1995
Decided June 29, 1995
JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The Endangered Species Act of 1973, 87 Stat.
884, 16 U.S.C. §1531 (1988 ed. and Supp. V) (ESA
or Act), contains a variety of protections designed to
save from extinction species that the Secretary of the
Interior designates as endangered or threatened.
Section 9 of the Act makes it unlawful for any person
to "take" any endangered or threatened species. The
Secretary has promulgated a regulation that defines
the statute's prohibition on takings to include
"significant habitat modification or degradation where
it actually kills or injures wildlife." This case presents
the question whether the Secretary exceeded his
authority under the Act by promulgating that
regulation.
I
Respondents in this action are small landowners,
logging companies, and families dependent on the
forest products industries in the Pacific Northwest and
in the Southeast, and organizations that represent their
interests. They brought this declaratory judgment
action against petitioners, the Secretary of the Interior
and the Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service, in
the United States District Court for the District of
Columik a to challenge the statutory validity of the
Secretary's regulation defining "harm," particularly the
inclusion of habitat modification and degradation in
the definition. Respondents challenged the regulation
on its face. Their complaint alleged that application
of the "harm" regulation to the red-cockaded
woodpecker, an endangered species, and the northern
spotted owl, a threatened species, had injured them
economically.
Respondents advanced three arguments to support
their submission that Congress did not intend the
word "take" in §9 to include habitat modification, as
the Secretary's "harm" regulation provides. First, they
correctly noted that language in the Senate's original
version of the ESA would have defined "take" to
include "destruction, modification, or curtailment of
[the] habitat or range" of fish or wildlife, but the
Senate deleted that language from the bill before
enacting it. Second, respondents argued that Congress
intended the Act's express authorization for the
Federal Government to buy private land in order to
prevent habitat degradation in §5 to be the exclusive
check against habitat modification on private property.
Third, because the Senate added the term "harm" to
the definition of "take" in a floor amendment without
debate, respondents argued that the court should not
interpret the term so expansively as to include habitat
modification.
The District Court considered and rejected each of
respondents' arguments, finding "that Congress
intended an expansive interpretation of the word 'take,'
an interpretation that encompasses habitat
modification." The court noted that in 1982, when
Congress was aware of a judicial decision that had
applied the Secretary's regulation, it amended the Act
without using the opportunity to change the definition
of "take." The court stated that, even had it found the
ESA"'silent or ambiguo"" as to the authority for the
Secretary's definition of "harm," it would nevertheless
have upheld the regulation as a reasonable
interpretation of the statute. The District Court
therefore entered summary judgment for petitioners
and dismissed respondents' complaint.
The Court of Appeals' decision created a square
conflict with a 1988 decision of the Ninth Circuit that
had upheld the Secretary's definition of "harm." The
Court of Appeals neither cited nor distinguished Palila
II, despite the stark contrast between the Ninth
Circuit's holding and its own. We granted certiorari
to resolve the conflict. Our consideration of the text
and structure of the Act, its legislative history, and the
significance of the 1982 amendment persuades us that
the Court of Appeals' judgment should be reversed.
II
The text of the Act provides three reasons for
concluding that the Secretary's interpretation is
reasonable. First, an ordinary understanding of the
word "harm" supports it. The dictionary definition of
the verb form of "harm" is "to cause hurt or damage:
to injure." In the context of the ESA, that definition
366
naturally encompasses habitat modification that
results in actual injury or death to members of an
endangered or threatened species.
Respondents argue that the Secretary should have
limited the purview of "harm" to direct applications of
force against protected species, but the dictionary
definition does not include the word "directly" or
suggest in any way that only direct or willful action
that leads to injury constitutes "harm." Moreover,
unless the statutory term "harm" encompasses indirect
as well as direct injuries, the word has no meaning
that does not duplicate the meaning of other words
that §3 uses to define "take." A reluctance to treat
statutory terms as surplusage supports the
reasonableness of the Secretary's interpretation.
Second, the broad purpose of the ESA supports
the Secretary's decision to extend protection against
activities that cause the precise harms Congress
enacted the statute to avoid. In TVA v. Hill, we
described the Act as "the most comprehensive
legislation for the preservation of endangered species
ever enacted by any nation." Whereas predecessor
statutes enacted in 1966 and 1969 had not contained
any sweeping prohibition against the taking of
endangered species except on federal lands, the 1973
Act applied to all land in the United States and to the
Nation's territorial seas. As stated in §2 of the Act,
among its central purposes is "to provide a means
whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered
species and threatened species depend may be
conserved. ... "
Respondents advance strong arguments that
activities that cause minimal or unforeseeable harm
will not violate the Act as construed in the "harm"
regulation. Respondents, however, present a facial
challenge to the regulation. Thus, they ask us to
invalidate the Secretary's understanding of "harm" in
every circumstance, even when an actor knows that an
activity, such as draining a pond, would actually result
in the extinction of a listed species by destroying its
habitat. Given Congress' clear expression of the
ESA's broad purpose to protect endangered and
threatened wildlife, the Secretary's definition of
"harm" is reasonable.
Third, the fact that Congress in 1982 authorized
the Secretary to issue permits for takings that
§9(a)(1)(B) would otherwise prohibit, "if such taking
is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying
out of an otherwise lawful activity,"strongly suggests
that Congress understood §9(a)(1)(B) to prohibit
indirect as well as deliberate takings. The permit
process requires the applicant to prepare a
"conservation plan" that specifies how he intends to
"minimize and mitigate" the "impact" of his activity
on endangered and threatened species, making clear
that Congress had in mind foreseeable rather than
merely accidental effects on listed species. No one
could seriously request an "incidental" take permit to
avert §9 liability for direct, deliberate action against a
member of an endangered or threatened species, but
respondents would read "harm" so narrowly that the
permit procedure would have little more than that
absurd purpose. "When Congress acts to amend a
statute, we presume it intends its amendment to have
real and substantial effect." Congress' addition of the§ 10 permit provision supports the Secretary's
conclusion that activities not intended to harm an
endangered species, such as habitat modification, may
constitute unlawful takings under the ESA unless the
Secretary permits them.
We need not decide whether the statutory
definition of "take" compels the Secretary's
interpretation of "harm," because our conclusions that
Congress did not unambiguously manifest its intent to
adopt respondents' view and that the Secretary's
interpretation is reasonable suffice to decide this case.
The latitude the ESA gives the Secretary in enforcing
the statute, together with the degree of regulatory
expertise necessary to its enforcement, establishes that
we owe some degree of deference to the Secretary's
reasonable interpretation.
m
Our conclusion that the Secretary's definition of
"harm" rests on a permissible construction of the ESA
gains further support from the legislative history of the
statute. The Committee Reports accompanying the
bills that became the ESA do not specifically discuss
the meaning of "harm," but they make clear that
Congress intended "take" to apply broadly to cover
indirect as well as purposeful actions. The Senate
Report stressed that ""[tlake' is defined . . . in the
broadest possible manner to include every conceivable
way in which a person can 'take' or attempt to 'take'
any fish or wildlife." The House Report stated that
"the broadest possible terms" were used to define
restrictions on takings. The House Report
underscored the breadth of the "take" definition by
noting that it included "harassment, whether
intentional or not." The Report explained that the
definition "would allow, for example, the Secretary to
regulate or prohibit the activities of birdwatchers
where the effect of those activities might disturb the
birds and make it difficult for them to hatch or raise
their young." These comments, ignored in the
dissent's welcome but selective foray into legislative
history, support the Secretary's interpretation that the
term "take" in §9 reached far more than the deliberate
actions of hunters and trappers.
The history of the 1982 amendment that gave the
Secretary authority to grant permits for "incidental"
takings provides further support for his reading of the
Act. The House Report expressly states that "[b]y use
of the word 'incidental' the Committee intends to cover
situations in which it is known that a taking will occur
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if the other activity is engaged in but such taking is
incidental to, and not the purpose of, the activity."
This reference to the foreseeability of incidental
takings undermines respondents' argument that the
1982 amendment covered only accidental killings of
endangered and threatened animals that might occur in
the course of hunting or trapping other animals.
Indeed, Congress had habitat modification directly in
mind: both the Senate Report and the House
Conference Report identified as the model for the
permit process a cooperative state- federal response to
a case in California where a development project
threatened incidental harm to a species of endangered
butterfly by modification of its habitat. Thus,
Congress in 1982 focused squarely on the aspect of
the "harm" regulation at issue in this litigation.
Congress' implementation of a permit program is
consistent with the Secretary's interpretation of the
term "harm."
IV
When it enacted the ESA, Congress delegated
broad administrative and interpretive power to the
Secretary. The task of defining and listing endangered
and threatened species requires an expertise and
attention to detail that exceeds the normal province of
Congress. Fashioning appropriate standards for
issuing permits under §10 for takings that would
otherwise violate §9 necessarily requires the exercise
of broad discretion. The proper interpretation of a
term such as "harm" involves a complex policy choice.
When Congress has entrusted the Secretary with broad
discretion, we are especially reluctant to substitute our
views of wise policy for his. In this case, that
reluctance accords with our conclusion, based on the
text, structure, and legislative history of the ESA, that
the Secretary reasonably construed the intent of
Congress when he defined "harm" to include
"significant habitat modification or degradation that
actually kills or injures wildlife."
In the elaboration and enforcement of the ESA,
the Secretary and all persons who must comply with
the law will confront difficult questions ofproximity
and degree; for, as all recognize, the Act encompasses
a vast range of economic and social enterprises and
endeavors. These questions must be addressed in the
usual course of the law, through case-by-case
resolution and adjudication.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring.
My agreement with the Court is founded on two
understandings. First, the challenged regulation is
limited to significant habitat modification that causes
actual, as opposed to hypothetical or speculative,
death or injury to identifiable protected animals.
Second, even setting aside difficult questions of
scienter, the regulation's application is limited by
ordinary principles of proximate causation, which
introduce notions offoreseeability. These limitations,
in my view, call into question Palila v. Hawaii Dept.
of Land and Natural Resources, and with it, many of
the applications derided by the dissent. Because there
is no need to strike a regulation on a facial challenge
out of concern that it is susceptible of erroneous
application, however, and because there are many
habitat-related circumstances in which the regulation
might validly apply, I join the opinion of the Court.
... As an initial matter, I do not find it as easy as
JUSTICE SCALIA does to dismiss the notion that
significant impairment of breeding injures living
creatures. To raze the last remaining ground on which
the piping plover currently breeds, thereby making it
impossible for any piping plovers to reproduce, would
obviously injure the population (causing the species'
extinction in a generation). But by completely
preventing breeding, it would also injure the
individual living bird, in the same way that sterilizing
the creature injures the individual living bird. To
"injure" is, among other things, "to impair." One need
not subscribe to theories of "psychic harm," to
recognize that to make it impossible for an animal to
reproduce is to impair its most essential physical
functions and to render that animal, and its genetic
material, biologically obsolete. This, in my view, is
actual injury.
In my view, then, the "harm" regulation applies
where significant habitat modification, by impairing
essential behaviors, proximately (foreseeably) causes
actual death or injury to identifiable animals that are
protected under the Endangered Species Act. Pursuant
to my interpretation, Palila II-under which the Court
of Appeals held that a state agency committed a
"taking" by permitting feral sheep to eat mamane-naio
seedlings that, when full-grown, might have fed and
sheltered endangered palila-was wrongly decided
according to the regulation's own terms. Destruction
of the seedlings did not proxi mately cause actual
death or injury to identifiable birds; it merely
prevented the regeneration of forest land not currently
inhabited by actual birds.
This case, of course, comes to us as a facial
challenge. We are charged with deciding whether the
regulation on its face exceeds the agency's statutory
mandate. I have identified at least one application of
the regulation that is, in my view, inconsistent with
the regulation's own limitations. That misapplication
does not, however, call into question the validity of
the regulation itself. One can doubtless imagine
questionable applications of the regulation that test
the limits of the agency's authority. However, it seems
to me clear that the regulation does not on its terms
exceed the agency's mandate, and that the regulation
has innumerable valid habitat-related applications.
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Congress may, of course, see fit to revisit this issue.
And nothing the Court says today prevents the agency
itself from narrowing the scope of its regulation at a
later date.
With this understanding, I join the Court's
opinion.
JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom THE CHIEF
JUSTICE and JUSTICE THOMAS join, dissenting.
I think it unmistakably clear that the legislation at
issue here (1) forbade the hunting and killing of
endangered animals, and (2) provided federal lands
and federal funds for the acquisition of private lands,
to preserve the habitat of endangered animals. The
Court's holding that the hunting and killing
prohibition incidentally preserves habitat on private
lands imposes unfairness to the point of financial
ruin-not just upon the rich, but upon the simplest
farmer who finds his land conscripted to national
zoological use. I respectfully dissent.
I
"'Harm' in the definition of 'take' in the Act means
an act which actually kills or injures wildlife. Such
act may include significant habitat modification or
degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife
by significantly impairing essential behavioral
patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering."
The regulation has three features which, for
reasons I shall discuss at length below, do not
comport with the statute. First, it interprets the statute
to prohibit habitat modification that is no more than
the cause-in- fact of death or injury to wildlife. Any
"significant habitat modification" that in fact produces
that result by "impairing essential behavioral patterns"
is made unlawful, regardless of whether that result is
intended or even foreseeable, and no matter how long
the chain of causality between modification and injury.
Second, the regulation does not require an "act":
the Secretary's officially stated position is that an
omission will do. The previous version of the
regulation made this explicit. When the regulation
was modified in 1981 the phrase "or omission" was
taken out, but only because (as the final publication of
the rule advised) "the [Fish and Wildlife] Service feels
that 'act' is inclusive of either commissions or
omissions which would be prohibited by section
(1538(a)(l)(B) ]." In its brief here the Government
agrees that the regulation covers omissions.
The third and most important unlawful feature of
the regulation is that it encompasses injury inflicted,
not only upon individual animals, but upon
populations of the protected species. "Injury" in the
regulation includes "significantly impairing essential
behavioral patterns, including breeding." Impairment
of breeding does not "injure" living creatures; it
prevents them from propagating, thus "injuring" a
population of animals which would otherwise have
maintained or increased its numbers. What the face of
the regulation shows, the Secretary's official
pronouncements confirm. The Final Redefinition of
"Harm" accompanying publication of the regulation
said that "harm" is not limited to "direct physical
injury to an individual member of the wildlife
species."
None of these three features of the regulation can
be found in the statutory provisions supposed to
authorize it. The term "harm" in §1532(19) has no
legal force of its own. An indictment or civil
complaint that charged the defendant with "harming"
an animal protected under the Act would be dismissed
as defective, for the only operative term in the statute
is to "take." If"take" were not elsewhere defined in
the Act, none could dispute what it means, for the
term is as old as the law itself. To "take," when
applied to wild animals, means to reduce those
animals, by killing or capturing, to human control.
This is just the sense in which "take" is used
elsewhere in federal legislation and treaty. And that
meaning fits neatly with the rest of § 1538(a)(1), which
makes it unlawful not only to take protected species,
but also to import or export them; to possess, sell,
deliver, carry, transport, or ship any taken species;
and to transport, sell, or offer to sell them in interstate
or foreign commerce. The taking prohibition, in other
words, is only part of the regulatory plan of
§1538(a)(1), which covers all the stages of the process
by which protected wildlife is reduced to man's
dominion and made the object of profit. It is obvious
that "take" in this sense-a term of art deeply embedded
in the statutory and common law concerning
wildlife-describes a class of acts (not omissions) done
directly and intentionally (not indirectly and by
accident) to particular animals (not populations of
animals).
The Court makes four other arguments. First,
"the broad purpose of the [Act] supports the
Secretary's decision to extend protection against
activities that cause the precise harms Congress
enacted the statute to avoid." I thought we had
renounced the vice of "simplistically. . . assum[ing]
that whatever furthers the statute's primary objective
must be the law." Deduction from the "broad
purpose" of a statute begs the question if it is used to
decide by what means (and hence to what length )
Congress pursued that purpose; to get the right
answer to that question there is no substitute for the
hard job (or in this case, the quite simple one) of
reading the whole text. "The Act must do everything
necessary to achieve its broad purpose" is the slogan
of the enthusiast, not the analytical tool of the arbiter.
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Second, the Court maintains that the legislative
history of the 1973 Act supports the Secretary's
definition. Even if legislative history were a
legitimate and reliable tool of interpretation (which I
shall assume in order to rebut the Court's claim); and
even if it could appropriately be resorted to when the
enacted text is as clear as this; here it shows quite the
opposite of what the Court says. I shall not pause to
discuss the Court's reliance on such statements in the
Committee Reports as "'[t]ake' is defined .. . in the
broadest possible manner to include every conceivable
way in which a person can 'take' or attempt to 'take'
any fish or wildlife." This sort of empty flourish-to
the effect that "this statute means what it means all the
way"-counts for little even when enacted into the law
itself.
This is enough to show, in my view, that the 1982
permit provision does not support the regulation. I
must acknowledge that the Senate Committee Report
on this provision, and the House Conference
Committee Report, clearly contemplate that it will
enable the Secretary to permit environmental
modification. But the text of the amendment cannot
possibly bear that asserted meaning, when placed
within the context of an Act that must be interpreted
(as we have seen) not to prohibit private
environmental modification. The neutral language of
the amendment cannot possibly alter that
interpretation, nor can its legislative history be
summoned forth to contradict, rather than clarify, what
is in its totality an unambiguous statutory text. There
is little fear, of course, that giving no effect to the
relevant portions of the Committee Reports will
frustrate the real-life expectations of a majority of the
Members of Congress. If they read and relied on such
tedious detail on such an obscure point (it was not,
after all, presented as a revision of the statute's
prohibitory scope, but as a discretionary-waiver
provision) the Republic would be in grave peril.
Fourth and lastly, the Court seeks to avoid the
evident shortcomings or the regulanon on the ground
that the respondents are challenging it on its face
rather than as applied. The Court seems to say that
even if the regulation dispenses with the foreseeability
of harm that it acknowledges the statute to require,
that does not matter because this is a facial challenge:
so long as habitat modification that would foreseeably
cause harm is prohibited by the statute, the regulation
must be sustained. Presumably it would apply the
same reasoning to all the other defects of the
regulation: the regulation's failure to require injury to
particular animals survives the present challenge,
because at least some environmental modifications kill
particular animals. This evisceration of the facial
challenge is unprecedented. It is one thing to say that
a facial challenge to a regulation that omits statutory
element x must be rejected if there is any set of facts
on which the statute does not require x. It is
something quite different-and unlike any doctrine of
"facial challenge" I have ever encountered-to say that
the challenge must be rejected if the regulation could
be applied to a state of facts in which element x
happens to be present. On this analysis, the only
regulation susceptible to facial attack is one that not
only is invalid in all its applications, but also does not
sweep up any person who could have been held liable
under a proper application of the statute. That is not
the law. Suppose a statute that prohibits
"premeditated killing of a human being," and an
implementing regulation that prohibits "killing a
human being." A facial challenge to the regulation
would not be rejected on the ground that, after all, it
could be applied to a killing that happened to be
premeditated. It could not be applied to such a
killing, because it does not require the factfinder to
find premeditation, as the statute requires. In other
words, to simplify its task the Court today confuses
lawful application of the challenged regulation with
lawful application of a different regulation, i.e., one
requiring the various elements of liability that this
regulation omits.
III
In response to the points made in this dissent, the
Court's opinion stresses two points, neither of which
is supported by the regulation, and so cannot validly
be used to uphold it. First, the Court and the
concurrence suggest that the regulation should be read
to contain a requirement of proximate causation or
foreseeability, principally because the statute does-and
"[njothing in the regulation purports to weaken those
requirements [of the statute]." I quite agree that the
statute contains such a limitation, because the verbs of
purpose in §1538(a)(1)(B) denote action directed at
animals. But the Court has rejected that reading. The
critical premise on which it has upheld the regulation
is that, despite the weight of the other words in
§1538(a)(1)(B), "the statutory term 'harm'
encompasses indirect as well as direct injuries."
Consequently, unless there is some strange category of
causation that is indirect and yet also proximate, the
Court has alreadv reiected its own basis for finding a
proximate-cause limitation in the regulation. In fact
"proximate" causation simply means "direct"
causation.
The regulation says (it is worth repeating) that
"harm" means (1) an act which (2) actually kills or
injures wildlife. If that does not dispense with a
proximate- cause requirement, I do not know what
language would. And changing the regulation byjudicial invention, even to achieve compliance with
the statute, is not permissible. Perhaps the agency
itself would prefer to achieve compliance in some
other fashion. We defer to reasonable agency
interpretations of ambiguous statutes precisely in
order that agencies, rather than courts, may exercise
policymaking discretion in the interstices of statutes.
Just as courts may not exercise an agency's power to
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adjudicate, and so may not affirm an agency order on
discretionary grounds the agency has not advanced, so
also this Court may not exercise the Secretary's power
to regulate, and so may not uphold a regulation by
adding to it even the most reasonable of elements it
does not contain.
The second point the Court stresses in its
response seems to me a belated mending of its hold.
It apparently concedes that the statute requires injury
to par ticular animals rather than merely to
populations of animals. The Court then rejects my
contention that the regulation ignores this
requirement, since, it says, "every term in the
regulation's definition of 'harm' is subservient to the
phrase "an act which actually kills or injures
wildlife.'" As I have pointed out, this reading is
incompatible with the regulation's specification of
impairment of "breeding" as one of the modes of
"kill[ing] or injur[ing] wildlife."
But since the Court is reading the regulation and
the statute incorrectly in other respects, it may as well
introduce this novelty as well-law la carte. As I
understand the regulation that the Court has created
and held consistent with the statute that it has also
created, habitat modification can constitute a "taking,"
but only if it results in the killing or harming of
individual animals, and only if that consequence is the
direct result of the modification. This means that the
destruction of privately owned habitat that is essential,
not for the feeding or nesting, but for the breeding, of
butterflies, would not violate the Act, since it would
not harm or kill any living butterfly. I, too, think it
would not violate the Act-not for the utterly
unsupported reason that habitat modifications fall
outside the regulation if they happen not to kill or
injure a living animal, but for the textual reason that
only action directed at living animals constitutes a
"take."
The Endangered Species Act is a carefully
considered piece of legislation that forbids all persons
to hunt or harm endangered animals, but places upon
the public at large, rather than upon fortuitously
accountable individual landowners, the cost of
preserving the habitat of endangered species. There is
neither textual support for, nor even evidence of
congressional consideration of, the radically different
disposition contained in the regulation that the Court
sustains. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
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A TINY SNAIL'S BIG IMPACT
The Endangered Species Act
Little Black Dots in the Water Are Symbols of Trouble in Idaho
The Seattle Times
Copyright 1995
Monday, July 17, 1995
Katherine Long
Bruneau, Idaho - Cattle rancher Eric Davis was born
and raised in the Bruneau River Valley, but the first
time he ever saw a Bruneau hot springsnail was on a
visit to Washington, D.C., in the mid-1980s.
Davis was in Idaho Sen. Jim McClure's office
discussing cattle business when McClure picked up a
test tube and shook it at Davis. Black dots, the size of
BB shot, danced in the formaldehyde.
"Do you know what's special about this snail?"
McClure asked.
Davis was about to find out.
On Jan. 25, 1993, those black dots became the
615th species to be listed under the Endangered
Species Act (ESA).
The snail's tale is a story about how the ESA can
be a powerful indicator that the environment is out of
whack, how it can protect the tiniest critter in the
name of biodiversity, and how it can drive a deep,
bitter wedge between urban and rural residents.
It is stories about creatures like the Bruneau snail
- and the myths that have grown up around them - that
flavor the present debate in Congress and the nation
about the future of the Endangered Species Act.
Although the Bruneau snail makes a good story -
salt-of-the-Earth farmers battling an unreasonable
bureaucracy - the truth lies elsewhere. Ranchers are
running out of water in southwest Idaho, and the
snail's plight is serving to push the problem to the
forefront.
A MATTER OF SCARCE WATER
There is only one place in the world to find the
Bruneau hot springsnail (the awkward spelling is
accurate; it's one of 65 species of springsnails): in
seeps and springs along a 5-mile stretch of the rugged
Bruneau River as it cuts a deep swath through the
high desert south of Boise.
This is one of the most sparsely populated places
in the West. About 7.9 inches of rain falls annually.
Temperatures plunge below zero in the winter and
soar above 100 in the summer.
The military once kept Trident nuclear missiles
hidden in the desert a few miles from Bruneau. It
exploded a simulated nuclear bomb here, and the
mushroom cloud soared high over the desert. Air
Force B-15s routinely make bombing runs at the
nearby Mountain Home range.
Settled in the 1870s, the Bruneau Valley today is
populated by the descendants of pioneer families who
turned this place into productive farmland, growing
potatoes and sugar beets and raising cattle.
They turned the desert into an oasis by tapping
deep wells that bring 140-degree water gushing to the
surface from 1,500 feet below ground - water heated
by the same geothermal forces that create Old Faithful
at Yellowstone National Park.
In the 1980s, the water table began dropping here
at a drastic rate; springs began drying up, and the
snails began disappearing as well. Federal
hydrologists thought ranchers were pumping water out
of the aquifer faster than it was being replenished.
Around the same time, the deep basalt canyons
and the roaring rapids of the Bruneau River were
discovered by kayakers and backpackers. They arrived
with gleaming kayak gear strapped to 4-wheel-drive
vehicles that would never see a day's work on the
ranch. Locals called them "recreationists," and it is not
a compliment.
Sometimes they left litter behind, caused range
fires, shot guns recklessly or left cattle gates open, the
ranchers complained. Occasionally they got sick or
lost in the desert, and Bruneau's all-volunteer
emergency medical technicians had to rescue them.
When the snail was proposed for endangered
status, Bruneau residents became suspicious that the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service had another agenda:
The agency wanted to curtail ranch activity and open
the area to greater recreation use, since many of the
federal employees were kayakers and hikers
themselves. Most of the rangeland is federally owned
and managed by the Bureau of Land Management.
As Bruneau veterinarian Ted Hoffman puts it,
"Recreationists don't want cow pies under their picnic
blanket."
And ranchers believed the ESA was sweeping
enough to allow environmentalists to use it for that
purpose.
The snail became a footnote in the national ESA
war of words. On the air, Rush Limbaugh and Paul
Harvey ridiculed it. In print, former President Nixon
blasted it.
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"Measures designed to protect endangered species
such as bears, wolves, and the bald eagle are now
being used to force Idaho farmers off their land for the
sake of the thumbnail-size (sic) Bruneau hot spring
snail . .," Nixon wrote in his last book, "Beyond
Peace."I
In Idaho, it became a symbol for all that is wrong
with the Endangered Species Act.
CANARY IN A COAL MINE
What a remarkable species, thought Idaho
environmentalist Randall Morris when he first
encountered Pyrgulopsis bruneauensis, the Bruneau
snail.
Its habitat says volumes about a species' ability to
find a tiny niche in the ecosystem and make a living
there. The snail spends its life grazing on algae
growing in 77- to 96-degree water that flows like a
sheet over vertical basalt rock faces.
This snail has probably been living in these hot
springs since the Pleistocene era 7 million to 12
million years ago, when camels and woolly mammoths
roamed Idaho. It is one of the few freshwater mollusks
that thrives in hot water.
When scientists visited Indian Bathtub a few
miles upriver from Bruneau in the 1960s, water
gushed out of the rocks above at the rate of 2,400
gallons a minute and spilled into a bowl-shaped
canyon and a deep pool at the bottom. The spring - so
named because it was a historic site for the Shoshone
tribe - contained tens of thousands of snails clinging
to the wet walls of the canyon. As many as 60 snails
were counted in a square inch.
Many environmentalists believe it's vital to
protect all critters because each contributes something
to the overall health of the planet. Snails occupy a
bottom rung of the food chain, providing a vital
service by grazing on water plants and becoming food
for bigger creatures like fish. There are 22 snails and
mollusks on the endangered-species list, six of them
from Idaho, and many hundreds are candidates for the
list.
When the Bruneau snail began disappearing,
environmentalists likened it to a canary in a coal mine.
Its decline foretold the disappearance of the hot
springs, the water and a unique ecosystem that existed
precariously at the edge of a desert.
If the snail ran out of water, the Bruneau Valley
farners would run out of water, too - just as surely as
the loggers in the Pacific Northwest were eventually
going to run out of old-growth trees.
Morris, chairman of the Committee for Idaho's
High Desert, suspected several large corporate ranches
in the immediate area around Indian Bathtub were at
fault for drilling big wells in the 1970s and pumping
the area dry.
But when the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
proposed listing the snail in 1985, a political battle
was joined that lasted nearly a decade. The Idaho
Senate delegation successfully delayed the listing until
the Idaho Conservation League and the Committee for
Idaho's High Desert took legal action. The Fish and
Wildife Service made a series of procedural mistakes
in following the rules of the ESA. The snail was listed
as endangered seven years after it was proposed.
By then, Indian Bathtub had virtually dried up.
More than half the known population of Bruneau
hot springsnails perished there in 1990; about 95
percent of the population has perished since the
1960s.
The remaining snails live in 128 seeps and
springs along a 5-mile stretch of the river. The
location of those springs is a secret. Biologists fear
somebody with a gallon of bleach could wipe out all
of this snail species on earth in an afternoon.
For the ranchers, the questions flow in an
unending stream: How can the feds take a reliable
count of these snails when they're the size of a BB
shot? What if it's just not practical to save the snail?
Why not gather a few snails and raise them in
aquariums? Why not transplant them to other hot
springs, getting them out of harm's way?
"If you can transplant wolves and bears, what's
wrong with transplanting snails - if your motive is
truly to save the species?" rancher Davis asks.
Four months after the snail was listed as
endangered, the Bruneau Valley Coalition and
Owyhee County Commissioners sued the federal
government. On Dec. 14, 1993, U.S. District Judge
Harold Ryan in Boise removed the snail from the
endangered-species list.
In his ruling, Ryan called the listing "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, and otherwise not
in accordance with the law." It is the first time a
species has ever been removed from the endangered
list by court action.
Bruneau residents have put their faith in Roy
Mink, director of the Idaho Water Institute at the
University of Idaho who has studied the Bruneau
Valley aquifer. Surprisingly, Mink also thinks that
better management of the aquifer must be part of the
solution. It's not a message people in Bruneau want to
hear, Mink concedes.
"As I've told the coalition, they are going to have
to use more efficient irrigation practices," Mink said.
"It's not going to be a nice, simple solution... . There
are people there who don't want to change."
Mink thinks the Endangered Species Act is
playing an important role in the Bruneau Valley.
Although initially polarizing, the ESA has "started to
get people to come together."
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Rick Johnson, executive director of the Idaho
Conservation League, said that without the ESA
Bruneau residents would have ignored the water crisis.
Although an Idaho law prohibits taking more water
out of an aquifer than is replenished every year
through rainfall and snow melt, Johnson said
environmentalists were able to force local officials to
take action only by invoking the ESA.
Johnson, for one, is sympathetic with the
ranchers. "These are the people who settled the
West," he said. "When ranches go, subdivisions come,
and frankly, I'd rather see the ranches."
Boise-area environmentalists appealed the judge's
ruling to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Two
weeks ago, the 9th Circuit reversed the lower court's
decision, declared that the Fish and Wildlife Service's
action was not arbitrary and capricious, and put the
snail back on the list.
The week before Memorial Day, ranchers Eric
Davis, Sherry Colyer and Cindy Bachman climbed
down into Indian Bathtub and discovered somebody
had constructed a crude, 2-foot-high dam of sand,
causing a thin trickle of rainwater to pool in the
spring.
It was a dilemma for the local people. On the one
hand, they should probably call the Fish and Wildlife
Service to report the damage. On the other hand, the
feds might think they did it.
In the end, they did nothing.
"You can read all the mistrust in it you want to,"
Davis said, backing away from the dam. "And that's
the hell of it. It's mutual."
THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: TWO FACTS
THAT MIGHT SURPRISE YOU.
1. It isn't responsible for the big drop in logging
on Northwest national forests. The environmentalist
spotted-owl lawsuits that led to U.S. District Judge
William Dwyer's three-year logging injunction that
led, in turn, to President Clinton's Northwest forest
plan were based not on the ESA, but on two other
environmental laws: the National Environmental
Policy Act and National Forest Management Act.
The outcome would have been little different if
the ESA had never been written.
The ESA has affected logging on many state and
private lands, however.
2. The ESA already takes economics into account.
The real issue is, how effectively?
Congress has injected economic considerations
into the law several times since the U.S. Supreme
Court's landmark 1978 ruling that the tiny snail darter
could indeed block the nearly complete Tellico Dam
in Tennessee.
Federal agencies already can, and sometimes do,
exclude land from the "critical habitat" they designate
for species if they determine economic costs are too
great. A cabinet-level "Endangered Species
Committee" can exempt projects from ESA
restrictions on economic grounds, even if extinction
results.
And the government can issue permits to private
landowners for activities likely to harm or kill
protected creatures, provided an alternate plan for
protecting habitat is in place.
ESA critics argue those provisions haven't
worked, that the law remains unbalanced. The
Endangered Species Committee, for instance, has
convened just three times, and exempted a project just
once.
AN ESA GLOSSARY
Endangered: In danger of extinction.
Threatened: In danger of becoming endangered.
Threatened species enjoy almost identical protection
to endangered species under ESA rules.
Species: Species, sub-species or, for vertebrates,
a "distinct population segment."
Take: What you can't do to a threatened or
endangered species. Definition includes harass, harm,
pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, collect.
Doesn't apply to plants on private land.
Harm: Interpreted by government to include
logging, development and other habitat modification.
Definition recently upheld by U.S. Supreme Court.
Incidental take permit: Document government can
issue that allows "take" if it's incidental to otherwise
lawful activity, and if habitat conservation plan for
protecting species has been approved.
Critical habitat: Lands considered essential to
conservation of listed species. ESA says critical
habitat to be designated at time of listing. Rarely
occurs in practice. In Washington, only spotted owl
has critical habitat.
Consultation: Process all federal agencies must
follow to ensure their actions - land management
activities, licenses, permits, etc. - don't jeopardize
existence of listed species or damage critical habitat.
Consultation can be "informal" if agency and Fish and
Wildlife Service concur action won't affect species,
"formal" if it might. Informal consultations far more
numerous.
Biological opinion: What the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service or National Marine Fisheries Service
issues at conclusion of formal consultation.
Jeopardy opinion: Biological opinion that
concludes project will jeopardize species or damage
critical habitat. Rare. Can effectively veto a project,
although agencies issuing opinions usually offer
alternatives that would not result in jeopardy.
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Endangered Species Committee, aka "God
Squad": Cabinet-level panel that can overrule
jeopardy opinions, even if extinction results.
Recovery plan: Government document that spells
out what should be done to get species "downlisted"
from endangered to threatened, or "delisted"
altogether. Nearly half of 955 listed species still have
no recovery plans.
THE ESA: SUCCESS OR FAILURE?
Depends on your criteria. If it's recovery of listed
species, the ESA is a flop. In the 22 years since
Congress passed the law, just six species have been
"delisted" because they have recovered. The gray
whale probably is the most prominent.
Meanwhile, 273 new species have been listed in
just the past three years.
But only eight species have been taken off the list
because they have gone extinct. In a 1992 report (the
most recent available), the Fish and Wildlife Service
said the condition of 38 percent of all listed species
either had improved or stabilized. "The ESA has
successfully prevented some species from becoming
extinct . . . " the National Academy of Sciences
concluded recently.
However, it added, "the ESA cannot by itself
prevent all species extinctions," especially as human
population and resource consumption increases.
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TOP COURT SHOWED SENSITIVITY TO BUSINESS LAST TERM,
DESPITE SPOTTED-OWL RULING
The Wall Street Journal
Copyright (c) 1995, Dow Jones & Co., Inc.
Friday, June 30, 1995
Paul M. Barrett
Staff Reporter
Business interests suffered a potentially
significant defeat as the Supreme Court rebuffed the
timber industry's effort to weaken federal protection
for the spotted owl and other endangered species.
But overall, the high court's 1994-95 term, which
ended yesterday with a burst of rulings, included some
important victories for business on issues ranging
from employee benefits to securities-fraud lawsuits.
Other decisions, including one involving disputes over
frequent-flier promotions, effectively split the
difference between corporate and consumer interests.
"Looking over all of these cases, I'd say the court
is showing greater sensitivity to the economic realities
of concern to business . . . even in cases where we
didn't have big wins," said Robin Conrad, a senior
lawyer at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
In yesterday's environmental ruling, the justices,
by a 6-3 vote, backed the broad reading of the federal
Endangered Species Act that regulators have used to
stop logging and development on millions of acres of
private land.
Enacted in 1973, the act has become a potent
symbol to conservatives of overreaching federal
regulation. Corporate and property-rights advocates
immediately vowed to redouble their support for
Republican proposals in Congress to roll back the
species-protection law through the legislative process.
Landowners and timber companies launched the
Supreme Court case with a 1991 suit that complained
that they were financially hurt by curbs on logging to
protect the spotted owl in the Pacific Northwest and
the red-cockaded woodpecker in the Southeast. They
challenged the government's interpretation of a part of
the Endangered Species Act that prohibits "harm" to
an animal threatened with extinction. The U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service has read "harm" to include
changes in habitats that injure wildlife.
A lower federal court said that harm was limited
to direct application of force to animals, but Justice
John Paul Stevens wrote for the Supreme Court
majority that "given Congress's clear expression of the
Endangered Species Act's broad purpose to protect
endangered and threatened wildlife, the [government's]
definition of'harm' is reasonable."
Despite yesterday's ruling, business lawyers
taking the long view said they were satisfied with the
Supreme Court term as a whole. Ms. Conrad of the
Chamber of Commerce pointed to a decision in
January involving job discrimination. While the
justices rejected employers' argument that bias suits
should automatically be thrown out when alleged
victims are shown to have broken company rules, they
added that money damage awards may be sharply
limited on the basis of an employee's misconduct.
Justice Anthony Kennedy, who wrote the majority
opinion, "struggled for balance" by giving some
weight to evidence of worker wrongdoing, Ms.
Conrad noted.
Still, employee advocates saw some reason to
cheer about the job-bias case. "No longer will
employers be allowed to escape liability for
discriminatory conduct with this convenient legal
loophole" of alleging worker misbehavior, said Judith
Lichtman, president of the Women's Legal Defense
Fund.
The frequent-flier decision and a ruling on truck
safety also allowed both business and its opponents to
walk away feeling at least partially vindicated. The
common question in these two cases was the degree to
which federal laws regulating industry precluded
consumer suits against companies, a perennial issue at
the Supreme Court.
American Airlines had been sued by passengers
unhappy over the carrier's cuts in its frequent-flier
program. American, a unit of AMR Corp., persuaded
the high court that when such claims are based on
state consumer-protection laws, they ought to be
pre.emptedbyfederalstatute. But the justices said
frustrated travelers could proceed with claims that
American effectively violated its contract to provide
customers with certain benefits. (The high court didn't
address the merits of the contract claims.)
In the truck-safety case, the justices said there
wasn't an applicable federal standard that pre-empted
a pair of suits filed in Georgia by accident victims and
their relatives against Freightliner Corp. and Navistar
International Corp. The plaintiffs said that under
Georgia injury law, the manufacturers should be held
liable for failing to equip their trucks with antilock
brakes. "We were pleased by the result," says Con
Hitchcock, an attorney with Public Citizen, a
consumer-advocacy group in Washington.
But corporate defense lawyers said that apart from
the defeat for the two truck makers, Justice Clarence
Thomas included language in his opinion for the
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unanimous high court that will make it easier in future
cases for businesses to argue for pre-emption of suits
filed under state laws.
First Amendment protection for advertising or
other "commercial speech" was again prominent on
the business docket, and here, too, the results were
mixed. Brewers persuaded the high court to strike
down archaic federal alcohol- labeling requirements in
a decision that will help other industries attack
disclosure rules they find excessive. But in a ruling
that cut in the other direction, the justices upheld a
Florida restriction on attorney solicitations of accident
victims and their relatives. Personal distaste on the
part of some justices for crass lawyer advertising may
explain that result as much as any constitutional
reasoning.
Business dodged a bullet in a March ruling on
pensions and other employee benefits. The justices
ruled unanimously that a widely used provision for
amending corporate employee benefit plans meets
federal statutory requirements for making such
changes. The opposite result would have subjected
many companies to massive liabilities for past
changes.
In February, the justices shielded companies from
certain investor suits alleging securities fraud. The
high court ruled 5-4 that a key provision of the federal
Securities Act of 1933 applies to initial public
offerings, not to subsequent market trading or
privately arranged deals. The securities industry had
warned that a broad reading of the 1933 act would
have stifled brokers' and other professionals'
communications about prospective stock transactions.
The event this term that may have attracted the
most avid attention from court watchers in the
corporate bar didn't even involve a decision on the
merits. It was the justices' announcement that in their
next term, which begins in October, they will once
again entertain corporate pleas for constitutional
limits on punitive damages.
While Congress continues to debate putting
legislative curbs on such damages, the justices agreed
to hear an appeal by BMW of a $2 million award in
an Alabama suiL The German auto maker was sued by
a customer who was dismayed to discover that his new
$40,000 sedan had been repainted on the way from
factory to showroom.
"Taking the BMW case may be the most
important thing [the high court] did the whole term,"
said Stephen Bokat, general counsel of the Chamber
of Commerce.
- SUPREME COURT BY THE NUMBERS
- Most Likely Allies: On the right, Justices Antonin
Scalia and Clarence Thomas once again voted
together most frequently -- in 83% of the
nonunanimous cases. On the left,
Clinton-appointed Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg
and Stephen Breyer stuck together 79% of the
time.
-- Least Agreeable Twosome: Justices Stevens and
Thomas voted the same way less than 11% of the
time in nonunanimous cases. The runners-up were
Justices Stevens and Scalia, at 19%.
- The Rookie Breyer: After Justice Ginsburg, his next
most likely ally was Justice David Souter, with
whom he voted 74% of the time in split cases. He
was least likely to agree with Justice Thomas
(43%).
-- Swing Votes: Justices Anthony Kennedy and
Sandra Day O'Connor cast key votes and wrote
critical opinions in most of the 16 cases decided
by a 5-4 vote. Kennedy was in the majority 13
times; O'Connor, 11.
-- Lone Dissenter: Justice Stevens, renowned for his
independence, filed solo objections to majority
opinions nearly 10% of the time.
- Unanimity and Splitsville: An unusually large 43%
of this term's decisions were unanimous. But a
relatively big share -- 20% - came down to the
wire with 5-4 rulings.
Note: Voting rates are based on justices reaching the
same result, but not necessarily by the same reasoning.
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KEY RULING PRESERVES U.S. HABITAT LAW
Los Angeles Times
Copyright, Los Angeles Times 1995
Friday, June 30, 1995
Maria Cone, David G. Savage
Times Staff Writers
In its most important environmental decision in
nearly two decades, the Supreme Court on Thursday
upheld the sweeping reach of the Endangered
Species Act, ruling that federal officials can block
development on private land in order to protect the
habitat of animals and plants on the verge of
extinction.
The 6-3 decision-which reversed an appeals
court ruling in an Oregon dispute over the northern
spotted owl-rejects timber industry claims that the
1973 law was intended merely to prohibit the killing
of animals, not to shield their habitats.
Had the ruling gone the other way, bald eagles,
spotted owls, salmon and other animals would be
guarded only from direct harm, such as hunting and
trapping, but not destruction of their breeding and
feeding grounds.
The case was closely watched by
environmentalists and landowners, and the impact of
the decision reverberated from Southern California's
expensive coastal real estate to the Pacific
Northwest's old-growth forests to Florida's salt
marshes.
The ruling stands as the lone victory for Interior
Secretary Bruce Babbitt and environmentalists since
Republicans took control of Congress-but it is a
critical one that resolves a longstanding controversy
over the scope of federal efforts to safeguard almost
1,000 species.
Nevertheless, all sides acknowledge that the
environmentalists' celebration could be short-lived.
From coast to coast, loggers, urban developers,
farmers and other landowners-trying to end costly
federal restrictions on use of their property-vowed
Thursday to keep battling in Congress and in the
courts, using other, constitutional grounds.
"If anything, this decision strengthens the hand
of those who want to bring long-overdue reforms to
the Endangered Species Act," said Rep. Wes Cooley
(R-Ore.). "Our priorities are way out of whack."
'"This decision," said Bob L. Vice, president of
the California Farm Bureau Federation, "is the
catalyst that will sweep needed reform to the
forefront."
To provide a safety net for animals and plants
on the verge of disappearing, the Interior
Department long has invoked the Endangered
Species Act's extraordinary power to block
developers' bulldozers, farmers' plows and loggers'
chain saws. But its implementation is frequently
slow and confusing, especially in the West, where it
has polarized environmentalists and landowners.
In its decision, the high court referred to the
pro-environment mind-set of Congress in the 1970s
and early 1980s, and indicated that if a reversal of
the 1973 law is warranted, it must come from
Congress itself.
Speaking in the courtroom Thursday, Justice
John Paul Stevens quoted former Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger, who was buried that same day.
Burger wrote in 1978 that Congress, in drafting the
law, intended "to halt and reverse the trend toward
species extraction, whatever the cost."
Congress "entrusted the (Interior) secretary with
broad discretion" to protect endangered wildlife,
Stevens wrote in the majority opinion. "We are
especially reluctant to substitute our views ... for
this."
Because most endangered and threatened
animals and plants are found on private land, a
National Academy of Scientists committee reported
last month that destruction of their natural habitat is
the primary danger they face.
"We have always known the Endangered
Species Act was good science, the court has
va1idated that it is good law as well," said John
McCaull of the National Audubon Society.
In dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia said he
believed that Congress had not intended to impose
"unfairness to the point of financial ruin-not just
upon the rich, but upon the simplest farmer." Also
dissenting were the court's two other most
conservative members, Clarence Thomas and Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist.
Many members of Congress agree and are
attemptmg to revise portions of the act that involve
private lands, a move that would render the court's
decision moot.
'Today's decision will serve as a rallying cry for
... reform from communities across the country that
have been hurt by the current law," said Sen. Slade
Gorton (R-Wash.), who has introduced a bill to
eliminate most of the restrictions on private land.
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The problem, he said, is not with the court's
interpretation of the law, but with the law itself. A
- House task force established to consider changes in
the Endangered Species Act is drafting a bill similar
to Gorton's measure, with the debate on both
proposals expected to begin in earnest next month.
But the movement to overhaul the nation's
premier conservation law, while backed by many
influential business groups and small landowners, is
divisive in Congress. Republicans do not all agree
on how far reform should go, and they might not
have enough votes to override a possible veto from
President Clinton.
Gorton and other members of Congress have
said that the provisions for private land should be
made voluntary because the law now puts the rights
of birds, bugs and plants over the rights of people
and their jobs.
But others-including Sen. John H. Chafee
(R-R.I.), who chairs the Senate's environment
panel-have said less sweeping changes would
correct problems that have made the process so
combative. Chafee has said he supports adding
economic incentives to reward landowners who
protect natural habitats, but he rejects efforts to
weaken the law's fundamental mandates.
The court's decision Thursday-and much of the
congressional debate-focuses on an often-challenged
definition of what it means to "take" a species.
Congress originally defined it as "harass, harm,
pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture or
collect."
Last year, the Interior Department's
longstanding rule on taking of species-including
protection of habitat-was invalidated by the appeals
court, which sided with the timber industry in saying
that it was unreasonable and far beyond what
Congress had intended.
But the high court rejected that stand and ruled
that harm to a habitat-such as cutting down trees
where a bird nests-constitutes harm to the species
itself
"To raze the last remaining ground on which (a
species) currently breeds . .. would obviously injure
the population (causing the species' extinction in a
generation)," wrote Justice Sandra Day O'Connor.
Calling it a "common sense interpretation of the
law followed by the Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush and
Clinton administrations," Babbitt said the Supreme
Court decision enables his agency to keep
negotiating conservation agreements with private
landowners.
Babbitt said the lower court decision, if left
intact, "would essentially have wiped out all the
conservation partnerships" that his agency recently
endorsed to try to defuse wars with landowners.
An example is a groundbreaking alliance
between Orange, San Diego and Riverside county
developers and Gov. Pete Wilson's Administration
to create preserves for the California gnatcatcher and
other species in diminishing coastal sage scrub.
"It (the court decision) makes it all the more
fundamentally important that we work to make this
law more flexible and user-friendly for landowners,"
Babbitt said.
Wilson's resources secretary, Douglas P.
Wheeler, agreed, saying the court decision "reaffirms
the essential link" between the survival of species
and the protection of their habitat.
James Geisinger, president of the Northwest
Forest Assn., a timber industry group, called the
ruling "a ludicrous interpretation" by the Supreme
Court that "we believe Congress will remedy."
The high court, in its last major ruling on the
law in 1978, upheld a decision to block a large dam
in Tennessee in order to protect the snail darter, a
tiny endangered fish.
The law was amended four years later, putting
in more flexibility, and the dam was eventually built.
Cone reported from Los Angeles and Savage
from Washington. Times staff writer Melissa Healy
in Washington also contributed to this story.
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94-1740 PACIFIC NORTHWEST GENERAT-
ING COOPERATIVE v. NORTHWEST POWER
PLANNING COUNCIL
State fish and wildlife agency recommendations-
Degree of deference due under Pacific Northwest
Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act.
Ruling below (Northwest Resource Informa-
tion Center Inc. v. Northwest Power Planning
Council, CA 9, 35 F.3d 1371):
Northwest Power Act provision that requires
Pacific Northwest Electric Power and Conserva-
tion Planning Council (which is agency created
by act to protect and enhance Columbia River
Basin's fish and wildlife to extent they are affect-
ed by development and operation of basin's hy-
dropower system) to give "due weight" to recom-
mendations and expertise of fish and wildlife
agencies and appropriate Indian tribes when re-
solving inconsistencies in measures recommended
for inclusion in Columbia River Basin fish and
wildlife program calls for high degree of defer-
ence to fishery managers' recommendations in
council's development of fish and wildlife pro-
gram for basin and its interpretation of act's fish
and wildlife provisions; in part because council
failed to explain statutory basis for its rejection of
recommendations of agencies and tribes, as re-
quired by statute, matter is remanded to council
for reconsideration.
Question presented: Does phrase "due weight"
in Section 4(h)(7) of Pacific Northwest Electric
Power Planning and Conservation Act, 16 USC
839b(h)(7), require respondent to give "high de-
gree of deference" to fish and wildlife program
recommendations and statutory interpretations
offered by state fish and wildlife agencies and
Indian tribes?
Petition for certiorari filed 4/19/95, by R.
Daniel Lindahl, R. Erick Johnson, and Bullivant,
Houser, Bailey, Pendergrass & Hoffman, all of
Portland, Ore.
380
NORTHWEST RESOURCE INFORMATION CENTER, INC., et. al
V.
NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, Respondent.
Nos. 92-70190, 92-70191, 93-70055, 93-70059 and 93-70064.
United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.
35 F.3d 1371
Argued and Submitted July 11, 1994.
Decided Sept. 9, 1994.
TANG, Circuit Judge:
Salmon and hydropower are the two great natural
resources of the Columbia River Basin. At odds for
most of this century, congressional action in 1980
injected a needed resolve into the conflict, inciting a
sense of optimism. Since that time, optimism has
largely given way to the dynamics of a classic struggle
between environmental and energy interests. The
climax of this particular struggle may well be our
review of the parties' efforts constituting what has
been touted as the world's largest program of
biological restoration.
The Northwest Resources Information Center,
Inc., and other environmental interests (collectively
'NRIC"), the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation (the "Yakima Nation"), and the
Aluminum Company of America and other companies
purchasing power from the Bonneville Power
Administration (the "Direct Service Industries" or
"DSIs") challenge the Pacific Northwest Electric
Power and Conservation Planning Council's final
amendments to the Columbia River Basin Fish and
Wildlife Program (the "Program" or "Strategy for
Salmon"). These cases have been consolidated for
decision on the petitions for review.
BACKGROUND
The flows of the Columbia River Basin are the
linchpin of the Pacific Northwest's economy. More
than one hundred and fifty dams are integrated to form
the world's largest hydropower system, generating
over forty percent of the nation's hydropower. The
generation of kilowatts, however, is not the only
reason for the Basin's importance; the Basin is the
habitat for what were once the world's largest salmon
runs.
As a result of human activities, anadromous fish
runs in the Columbia River Basin have dwindled from
an estimated ten to sixteen million fish annually,
before European settlement in the Northwest, to about
two-and-one-half million today. Of this annual loss,
eighty percent is attributable
development and operation.
to hydropower
In the wake of devastating losses of salmon and
steelhead in the mid-1970s, Congress enacted the Fish
and Wildlife Coordination Act in 1976. The
Coordination Act provided that fish and wildlife have
"equal consideration" in the planning and
development of hydropower projects. In 1978,
however, Federal fishery agencies considered invoking
the protection of the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"),
for Snake River runs. Despite the mandate of the
Coordination Act, it was not until the threat of action
under the ESA that the depletion of anadromous fish
in the Columbia River Basin was considered to be
more than merely an issue that would resolve itself
over time. Also in 1978, Congress was preparing to
revise Northwest electric policies in light of forecasts
predicting serious power shortages during critical
water years expected in the 1980's. Recognizing the
tremendous, detrimental impact of dams on the fish
runs, Congress acknowledged "that no longer [should]
fish and wildlife be given a secondary status."
Ultimately, the Council's Strategy for Salmon
called for both immediate and intermediate-term
actions to enhance salmon survival in the rivers:
increased river velocities, dam screens, water spills,
reduced predation, and downstream barge
transportation ofjuveniles....
Since 1980, at the latest, the debate concerning
the decline of anadromous fish runs in the Columbia
River Basin has revolved around the issue of river
flows. Not surprisingly, how the Council's Program
addresses this primary issue is the basis for the instant
petitions for review. NRIC, the Yakima Nation, and
the DSIs each argue for restriking the balance between
salmon and energy. Nevertheless, Petitioners find
common ground in arguing that the Council failed to
explain the basis for its flow decisions and failed to
adopt and apply proper standards and objectives.
381
DISCUSSION
Petitioners agree in arguing that the Council
failed to explain a "rational connection between the
facts found and the choice[s] made" in the Strategy for
Salmon. More specifically, NRIC and the Yakima
Nation mount a procedural challenge to the Program
under §839b(h)(7), alleging that the Council failed to
explain, in the Program, a statutory basis for its
rejection of river flow recommendations of fishery
managers. NRIC and the Yakima Nation also
contend that the Council failed to properly consider
the criteria in §839b(h)(6) for adopting program
measures. Underlying each of these claims is an
assertion that the Council failed to give due deference
to fishery managers.
Responding to these challenges, the Council
contends that the NPA and the record support each of
the Strategy for Salmon's measures.
I. NRIC's and the Yakima Nation's Petitions
NRIC and the Yakima Nation first charge that the
Council's Program failed to explain a statutory basis
for its rejection of the recommendations of fishery
managers as required under §839b(h)(7).
Study of the Strategy for Salmon evokes an
undeniable sense of the tremendous effort and
commitment invested to create such a program. The
Council has the unenviable task of sorting through the
multitude of diverse recommendations and compiling
measures that form the framework of an aggressive,
effective, and balanced fish and wildlife program. To
ensure a balance of interests in the program, the Act
specifically requires the Council to explain, in the
program, its reasons for rejecting recommendations.
This requirement is critical to our review of Council
decisions, but, more importantly, it forces the Council
to hold out its final decisions and their rationale for
public consideration and scrutiny. The Council
neglected this mandate of the Act.
The Strategy for Salmon fails to explain the
reasons for the Council's decisions rejecting
recommendations of the agencies and tribes. The
Council, however, directs our attention to other
documents in the administrative record to convince us
of its compliance with §839b(h)(7). Most notable are
documents related to amendments created during the
first and second phases of the Council's
decision-making process.
In sum, §839b(h)(7) requires the Council to
explain, in the Program, a statutory basis for its
rejection of recommendations. The Council failed to
do so here with respect to the recommendations of
agencies and tribes and was, therefore, not in
accordance with the NPA. As a consequence, we
remand this matter to the Council with instructions
that it comply with the written statutory explanation
requirement of §839b(h)(7).
NRIC and the Yakima Nation contend that the
Council failed to comply with the criteria set out in
§839b(h)(6) for adopting specific program measures.
To decide this issue, we must determine the meaning
of §839b(h)(7)'s mandate that the Council give "due
weight" to the recommendations and expertise of
fishery managers when resolving inconsistencies in
recommendations of program measures, and the nature
of the criteria in §839b(h)(6).
NRIC and the Yakima Nation claim that the fish
and wildlife provisions of the Act and their legislative
history reveal a congressional intent that the Council
give a high degree of deference to fishery managers.
The Council, on the other hand, argues that fishery
managers are entitled to merely a nominal degree of
deference, and urges that the discretion granted to it in
the fish and wildlife provisions strictly limits judicial
review of its decisions.
There is no question that §839b(h)(7) requires
that deference be given to the recommendations and
expertise of agencies and tribes--the question is how
much deference is due.
In stark contrast are the fish and wildlife
provisions of §839b(h). To initiate the development
of a fish and wildlife program, Congress required the
Council to solicit recommendations from the region's
fishery managers. The Act requires the Council to
give notice of all the recommendations and supporting
materials to, among others, the Administrator, federal
and state fish and wildlife agencies, Indian tribes,
federal agencies that manage, operate, or regulate the
hydrosystem. The Council is then required to provide
for public participation and comment on the
recommendations. From this process, "[tihe Council
shall develop a program on the basis of such
recommendations, supporting documents, and views
and information obtained through public comment and
participation, and consultation with the agencies,
tribes, and customers referred to in subparagraph (A)
of paragraph (4)." In short, the NPA requires the
Council to develop the program from sources outside
the Council. In doing so, the Council must adopt
program measures that are consistent with the
purposes of the Act--the protection, mitigation, and
enhancement of fish and wildlife, "while assuring the
region an adequate, efficient, economical, and reliable
power supply." If reconciliation of recommendations
is required, the Council must give "due weight" to
fishery managers' recommendations, and may
disregard such recommendations only after explaining
in the program a statutory basis for its decision.
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We conclude that §839b(h) binds, more than
unleashes, the Council's discretion with respect to fish
and wildlife issues. Indeed, we are convinced that the
fish and wildlife provisions of the NPA and their
legislative history require that a high degree of
deference be given to fishery managers' interpretations
of such provisions and their recommendations for
program measures.
We next turn to the nature of the §839b(h)(6)
criteria. The Council claims that the criterion in
§39b(h)(6) merely "set the agenda but do not dictate
the substance of measures." As a result, the Council
urges, its "determinations necessarily involve a great
deal ofjudgment, not well suited for judicial review."
The Council misconstrues §839b(h)(6).
The criteria in §839b(h)(6) are mandatory. The
provision states that the Council shall include
program measures that adhere to each of the criterion.
As recognized above, the fish and wildlife provisions
of the Act significantly circumscribe the Council's
discretion with respect to fish and wildlife. Construing
the criteria in §839b(h)(6) as substantive criteria is
consistent with that construction.
The first criterion requires that measures
"complement the existing and future activities of the
Federal and the region's State fish and wildlife
agencies and appropriate Indian tribes." Since
adoption of the Program, there have been various
proceedings under the ESA concerning listed
anadromous fish in the Basin. Several ESA actions
have been filed, the lead case by the State of Idaho
against NMFS and other agencies in 1992. That case
challenges government actions in operating the
Federal Columbia River Power System ("FCRPS") in
1993. More specifically, the Idaho Department of
Fish and Game claims that NMFS and other Federal
agencies have violated the ESA by "(1) failing to
insure that FCRPS operations are not likely to
jeopardize listed species; (2) omitting consideration
of all relevant scientific factors; (3) failing to include
all reasonable and prudent mitigation measures to
reduce incidental take of listed species; (4) limiting
consideration of short and long term impacts and
measures to the immediate nine-month operational
period under consideration; and (5) operating the
FCRPS between April 15 and May 26, 1993[,] prior
to completion of the biological opinion."
The second criterion requires that measures be
based on and supported by the "best available
scientific knowledge." That the standard requires only
the best available scientific knowledge ensures action
in the promulgation and implementation of a fish and
wildlife program. Textual consistency with
§839b(h)(7) requires that the Council defer to the
agencies' and tribes' recommendations as to what is
the best available scientific knowledge. Moreover, the
standard requires only the best available scientific
knowledge, not data. Section 839b(h)(6)(B) suggests,
therefore, that reasonable inferences and predictions
may be drawn from the best available scientific
knowledge. In this case, determining whether the
program measures are based on and supported by the
best available scientific evidence is prevented by the
Council's failure to comply with §839b(h)(7)'s written
statutory explanation requirement.
The third criterion requires that alternative
measures be evaluated for effectiveness in achieving
sound biological objectives. Sound biological
objectives relate the biological needs of fish and
wildlife to the operations of the hydropower system.
If two measures are equally effective in achieving the
same biological objectives, the Council must adopt
the one with less economic cost.
The fourth criterion requires that measures "be
consistent with the legal rights of appropriate Indian
tribes in the region." Congress recognized the
preexisting rights that tribes reserved for themselves,
in contrast to, rights granted to them by the
Government. In this light, it is reasonable to conclude
that measures that would allow the extinction of Snake
River fall chinook, for instance, upon which the
Yakima people largely depend for their livelihood,
may very well be inconsistent with the Yakima
Nation's treaty reserved fishing rights. We note this
possibility only to sensitize the parties to this Court's
duty to honor the purposes of the Act while, at the
same time, strictly construing its language.
The last criterion addresses the particular needs of
anadromous fish. It requires that measures provide
"improved survival of such fish" at hydropower
facilities, and "flows of sufficient quality and quantity
between such facilities to improve production,
migration, and survival of such fish as necessary to
meet sound biological objectives." This criterion
accents the importance of the Council strictly
complying with the Act's mandates with respect fish
and wildlife, especially that requiring that a high
degree of deference be given to fishery managers. The
Council's failure to comply with §839b(h)(7) prevents
us from addressing the issue of whether the Council
complied with this criterion in adopting the Strategy
for Salmon's measures. The record evokes in us,
however, a strong sense of skepticism; without
explanation, the Council rejected the consensus of
most fishery managers on the issues of flows and
biological objectives in favor of the recommendations
of power interests and DSIs.
CONCLUSION
The NPA adopted fish and wildlife restoration as
a primary goal, leaving to the Council and interested
parties the onerous burden of deciding how to restore
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such resources. In doing so, the Act placed a premium
on prompt action, allowing decisions to be made on
the best available scientific knowledge. It also limited
the role of economic considerations in decision-
making. Most importantly, however, the Act
acknowledged fish and wildlife as an irreplaceable
finite resource.
Unfortunately, the record reveals few profound
successes resulting from these innovations in thinking.
The Council's approach seems largely to have been
from the premise that only small steps are possible, in
light of entrenched river user claims of economic
hardship. Rather than asserting its role as a regional
leader, the Council has assumed the role of a
consensus builder, sometimes sacrificing the Act's fish
and wildlife goals for what is, in essence, the lowest
common denominator acceptable to power interests
and DSIs. The Council has failed at least two
requirements of the NPA in its process, as well as
§706 of the APA: it has failed to explain a statutory
basis for its rejection of recommendations of fishery
managers and it has failed to evaluate proposed
program measures against sound biological
objectives. There is also concern that the Council may
have failed to give proper deference to fishery
managers and to fully comply with other substantive
criteria for program measures. We, therefore, remand
these matters to the Council for reconsideration
consistent with this opinion.
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PLAN TO RESTORE SALMON FALLS SHORT, COURT SAYS
Portland Oregonian
Saturday, September 10, 1994
Bob Egelko
The Associated Press
A four-state council's plan for restoring Columbia
Basin salmon runs is too deferential to industry
concerns and falls short of required fish and wildlife
restoration goals, a federal appeals court said Friday.
The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals said in
part that the plan fails to explain its rejection of
increased river flows recommended by fishery
managers.
The court ordered the Northwest Power Planning
Council to reconsider its 1992 "Strategy for Salmon"
and follow a federal law that orders the council to
make fish and wildlife restoration a primary goal, with
economic concerns secondary.
"The council's approach seems largely to have
been from the premise that only small steps are
possible, in light of entrenched river user claims of
economic hardship," said Judge Thomas Tang in the
3-0 decision.
"Rather than asserting its role as a regional
leader, the council has assumed the role of a
consensus-builder, sometimes sacrificing the
(Northwest Power) Act's fish and wildlife goals for
. . . the lowest common denominator acceptable to
power interests and (industrial power users)."
A group of aluminum and other metal companies,
the Direct Service Industries, which buy electricity
from the Bonneville Power Administration, also
appealed the council's plan, saying it was too
demanding. But the court rejected the group's
argument that the council should have been required
to justify the economic costs of each protective
measure.
In the 1980 federal law that created the council,
"Congress expected increased costs and lost profits to
the hydropower system to the extent the system was
responsible for damaging fish and wildlife in the
region," Tang said.
The council, composed of two representatives
each from Idaho, Montana, Oregon and Washington,
is required by law to make plans to protect the basin's
fish and wildlife from the effects of hydroelectric
power development. The court said 80 percent of the
annual loss of salmon and steelhead in the basin was
due to dams.
The December 1992 plan, the most recent of
several adopted by the council, largely followed flow
levels recommended by power interests and industries,
the court said. It said the council rejected
recommendations by fishery managers in state
agencies and in Indian tribes for significantly
increased flows in the Columbia and Snake rivers.
The court said federal law requires the council to
give "a high degree of deference" to the fishery
managers, who have expertise in fish and wildlife
protection that the council lacks.
Tang said he was skeptical about whether the
council had met that requirement, but he couldn't tell
for sure because the council violated another legal
requirement by failing to explain its reasons for
rejecting the agencies' and tribes' recommendations.
The law allows the council to reject those
recommendations only if they would be inconsistent
with the protective purposes of the law or less
effective than the council's own proposals, Tang said.
He said the council must state its reasons so that the
public and the court could evaluate them.
The council's plan also lacks the "sound
biological objectives" required by the law, and instead
merely sets a goal of doubling the current salmon
population, with no firm deadline, Tang said.
Lawyers for the Northwest Resource Information
Center and other conservation groups that challenged
the plan said the ruling was a hopeful sign.
"This is about the sixth in a series of wakeup calls
to the federal agencies that manage Columbia River
fish," said Todd True, a lawyer with the Sierra Club
Legal Defense Fund. "We have a serious
environmental crisis on our hands. They have to take
the laws that protect fish seriously."
Adam Berger, another lawyer with the
organization, said the ruling came at a good time,
because the four-state council is reviewing its salmon
program and the National Marine Fisheries Service is
considering a plan to restore Snake River salmon.
"This opinion should tell both of those authorities
that they now have to take substantial steps necessary
to restore the fish," he said.
Ed Sheets, executive director of the Northwest
Power Planning Council, said the council would be
working on amendments to the plan next week and
would review the ruling "to see if it provides useful
guidance."
"We've tried to strike a balance, as I think the(Northwest) Power Act requires us to do," Sheets said.
He cited the law's requirement to protect fish and
wildlife while preserving "an adequate, efficient,
economical and reliable power supply."
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Nancy Tester, environmental program manager
for the Direct Service Industries, said she disagreed
with the court's conclusion that the council was too
deferential to power users and was dismayed that the
court had not required cost-benefit analyses of
measures to protect fish.
"It appears that once again there is no requirement
for accountability," she said.
Estimating the industries' spending for fish
protection at $100 million over the last two years,
Tester said, "We have continued to spend an
inordinate amount of money on those actions without
any determination of their effectiveness."
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94-1807 McCLELLAN ECOLOGICAL SEEPAGE
SITUATION v. PERRY
Action to enforce Clean Water Act and Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act at facilities en-
gaged in remedial actions under CERCLA.
Ruling below (CA 9, 47 F.3d 125, 39 ERC
2089):
Section I13(h) of Comprehensive Environmen-
tal Response, Compensation and Liability Act,
which applies to citizen suits as well as to suits by
potentially responsible parties, bars challenges
under any environmental statute-not just
CERCLA-that would interfere with expeditious
cleanup of superfund sites; accordingly, Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act and Clean Water
Act requirements that citizen group sought to
impose through its suit against federal govern-
ment constituted prohibited interference with
CERCLA-governed cleanup of federal facility,
precluding federal district court jurisdiction to
rule on citizen group's claims in connection with
such cleanup.
Question presented: Did Ninth Circuit err in
holding that Section 113(h) of CERCLA, 42
USC 9613(h), bars suits to enforce Clean Water
Act and RCRA at facilities engaged in remedial
actions under CERCLA?
Petition for certiorari filed 5/1/95, by Michael
Axline, Marianne Dugan, and Western Environ-
mental Law Center, all of Eugene, Ore.
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McCLELLAN ECOLOGICAL SEEPAGE SITUATION
Mary Fisher, Charles Yarbrough, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
V.
William J. PERRY
Secretary of the United States Department of Defense, Defendant-Appellee.
Nos. 91-16308, 91-16467.
United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.
47 F.3d 325
Argued and Submitted Aug. 9, 1994.
Decided Jan. 30, 1995.
CANBY, Circuit Judge:
This is an action brought by McClellan
Ecological Seepage Situation ("MESS") to require
McClellan Air Force Base to comply with various
environmental laws. The district court ruled against
MESS and MESS appealed. The Secretary of Defense
cross-appealed on the ground that MESS's appeal was
untimely--a contention that we reject.
ANALYSIS
I. Scope of CERCLA §113(h)
Section 113(h) of CERCLA provides:
(h) Timing of review No Federal court shall have
jurisdiction under Federal law .. . or under State
law . . . to review any challenges to removal or
remedial action selected under section 9604 of
this tide, or to review any order issued under
section 9606(a) of this title, in any action except
one of the following:
(4) an action under section 9659 of this title
(relating to citizen suits) alleging that the removal
or remedial action taken under section 9604 of
this title or secured under section 9606 of this
title was in violation of any requirement of this
chapter....
On its face, then, section 113(h) precludes
contemporaneous challenges to CERCLA cleanups.
MESS interprets this section, however, to mean that
federal courts are jurisdictionally barred from
reviewing only those challenges to CERCLA cleanup
actions brought under CERCLA provisions. In our
view, however, section 113(h) is not so limited.
Section 113(h) is clear and unequivocal. It
amounts to a "blunt withdrawal of federal
jurisdiction." Contrary to MESS's position, the
unqualified language of the section precludes "any
challenges" to CERCLA Section 104 clean-ups, not
just those brought under other provisions of
CERCLA.
MESS expresses concern that waste storage and
disposal site operators like McClellan might try to
avoid RCRA liability by hiding under the protective
umbrella of a CERCLA cleanup plan. MESS and
amici argue that in this situation, affected citizens
would never have recourse for the resulting RCRA
violations, and pollution would go unchecked.
Whatever the theoretical potential for an evasion
of RCRA in other cases, it does not exist here.
McClellan's Management Action Plan incorporates
the requirements of all relevant hazardous waste
legislation. The parties to the Agreement clearly
intended that McClellan be bound by these
requirements. The Management Action Plan is a
comprehensive scheme that takes into account all
annicable statutory requirements, including those of
RCRA and the Clean Water Act, and coordinates
compliance with each. McClellan therefore has,
without question, an obligation to comply with
substantive RCRA and Clean Water Act
requirements.
It is true that MESS is now unable to obtain
immediate judicial review of McClellan's compliance
with RCRA, the Clean Water Act, and similar
statutory requirements during the course of the
cleanup program, but this inability was Congress's
choice. Although judicial review is an important
element in the enforcement of laws such as RCRA and
the Clean Water Act, Congress has determined that
the need for swift execution of CERCLA cleanup
plans outweighs this concern. Section 113(h) protects
the execution of a CERCLA plan during its pendency
from lawsuits that might interfere with the expeditious
cleanup effort. This result furthers the policy
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underlying CERCLA by allowing a quick response to
serious hazards. Congress concluded that the need for
such action was paramount, and that peripheral
disputes, including those over "what measures actually
are necessary to clean-up the site and remove the
hazard," may not be brought while the cleanup is in
process.
We recognize that the application of Section
113(h) may in some cases delay judicial review for
years, if not permanently, and may result in irreparable
harm to other important interests. Whatever its
likelihood, such a possibility is for legislators, and not
judges, to address. We must presume that Congress
has already balanced all concerns and "concluded that
the interest in removing the hazard of toxic waste from
Superfund sites" clearly outweighs the risk of
irreparable harm.
Having concluded that Section 113(h) would bar
any of MESS's claims that challenge the CERCLA
effort at McClellan, we must now determine which, if
any, of the claims actually comprise "challenges" to
the cleanup within the meaning of the statute.
Because the effects of each of MESS's claims upon the
cleanup are distinct, we analyze them separately.
II. The "Inactive" Waste Pits and RCRA
Compliance
Although MESS's complaint sought various
forms of injunctive relief, MESS now seeks primarily
to compel McClellan's compliance with RCRA's
individual reporting and permitting requirements, in
addition to the Interagency Agreement's
comprehensive requirements. MESS argues that, in
seeking such relief it does not challenge the CERCLA
cleanup plan.
We agree with McClellan, however, that such
relief would constitute the kind of interference with the
cleanup plan that Congress sought to avoid or delay
by the enactment of Section 113(h). The Interagency
Agreement now integrates RCRA obligations into its
own reporting requirements. The parties to the
Agreement deemed those reporting requirements to be
sufficient; MESS clearly wants more. The additional
reporting requirements that MESS would have us
impose would second-guess the parties' determination
and thus interfere with the remedial actions selected
under CERCLA Section 104.
To an even greater degree, an injunction or
declaration requiring McClellan to comply with
RCRA permitting requirements would also interfere
with the CERCLA cleanup. As McClellan points out,
the entire purpose of a permit requirement is to allow
the regulating agency to impose requirements as a
condition of the permit. The injection of new
requirements for dealing with the inactive sites that
are now subject to the CERCLA cleanup (or
McClellan's defense against imposition of such
requirements) would clearly interfere with the cleanup.
It is true, as MESS argues, that every action that
increases the cost of a cleanup or diverts resources or
personnel from it does not thereby become a
"challenge" to the cleanup. The enforcement of
minimum wage requirements, for example, might
increase the cost of a cleanup and even divert
personnel from cleanup duties without becoming a
challenge to the cleanup. MESS's lawsuit, however,
is far more directly related to the goals of the cleanup
itself than is the hypothetical minimum wage action.
MESS, for all practical purposes, seeks to improve on
the CERCLA cleanup as embodied in the Interagency
Agreement Its action qualifies as a "challenge" to the
cleanup.
III. Inactive Waste Pits and Clean Water Act
Compliance
MESS alleges, and McClellan does not dispute,
that contaminants from the inactive pits continue to
leach downward into groundwater beneath the Base.
This leaching, according to MESS, constitutes a
"point discharge" of pollutants into "waters of the
United States" which, without an authorization permit,
violates [the] Clean Water Act. MESS would require
McClellan to procure a Clean Water Act permit
authorizing all leaching from the inactive pits. The
relief sought would also compel McClellan's
compliance with individual state notification
requirements for contaminant discharge. Absent the
permit and compliance, MESS would prohibit any
discharges.
McClellan has amply demonstrated that the
leaching in question is closely connected to the
CERCLA action. The leaching process is a necessary
component of the CERCLA plan's groundwater
extraction system, which was designed to prevent
migration of contaminants away from McClellan. Any
delay or interruption of the process will slow the
cleanup action, a result that Congress sought to avoid
in enacting Section 113(h). The district court found
that claims focusing on the groundwater underlying
the Base were "directed at an integral part of the
cleanup and, as such, may not be sustained until
cleanup is completed." We agree with the district
court that MESS's Clean Water Act and state water
law claims, as they pertain to leaching of
contaminants, are challenges to the continuing
CERCLA response and are consequently beyond
federal jurisdiction.
A slightly different question exists with regard to
McClellan's alleged discharges of pollutants into
surface waters. MESS asserts in its complaint that
contaminants from the inactive pits discharge laterally,
through perched groundwater, seeps and pipes, into
the Magpie Creek at points where it crosses the Base.
McClellan responds that because the sources of the
alleged contaminants, the inactive pits, are subjects of
the CERCLA response action and its attendant
Management Action Plan, the surface water
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contamination claims also should be barred. We
agree.
The source of the alleged surface water
contaminants is not dispositive of MESS's claim.
What is dispositive, however, is the court's inability to
fashion any remedy that would not interfere with
McClellan's CERCLA groundwater extraction system.
While the contaminants allegedly destined for Magpie
Creek are moving laterally through the soil, unlike the
downward-leaching pollutants, it is impossible to
require any Clean Water Act compliance measure to
remedy lateral contaminant discharges from the pits
that would not actively "challenge" CERCLA
activities directed at remedying the downward
discharges. MESS's claims pertaining to discharge via
seepage and pipes into Magpie Creek therefore are
excluded from federal court jurisdiction.
IV. McClellan's Current Operations
MESS also claims that "current operations" at
McClellan are not in compliance with RCRA
permitting requirements. We accept the district
court's determination that the Interagency Agreement
does not cover McClellan's active sites. Findings and
Determination RE: Jurisdiction, p. 26. Section 113
thus does not bar MESS's claims asserting RCRA
noncompliance at those active sites. Some dispute
existed between the parties both in briefing and at oral
argument over what the term "current operations"
included. In order to clarify the limits of our holding,
we also adopt the district court's characterization of
"current operations" as those involving active waste
treatment and storage sites not covered by the
Interagency Agreement.
When the district court entered its original
judgment, it purported to determine all claims.
Because the jurisdictional bar of Section 113(h) of
CERCLA had not been asserted before the district
court at that time, the court did not differentiate in its
opinions between those sites that were subject to the
CERCLA cleanup plan and those "active" sites that
were not. It is accordingly not clear to us now just
what claims remain relating to the "active" sites not
covered by the cleanup plan, and what disposition, if
any, the district court already may have made of those
claims.
That determination is a difficult one no matter
who makes it. We conclude, however, that the district
court is in the best position to secure the active
participation of the litigants in determining exactly
what, if anything, is left of this case. We therefore
remand the matter to the district court for
determinations concerning: (1) the extent of MESS's
claims not precluded by Section 113(h) of CERCLA
or otherwise abandoned; (2) the degree to which the
district court has already ruled on those claims: and
(3) any further determinations (with or without
evidentiary proceedings) that the district court deems
appropriate or necessary to dispose of this case and
enter a new final judgment.
CONCLUSION
The district court correctly determined that
CERCLA Section 113(h) withholds federal
jurisdiction to review citizen suits and actions brought
under other, non-CERCLA statutes that challenge
ongoing CERCLA cleanup actions. The court was
also correct in finding that all of MESS's claims for
relief connected with McClellan's inactive pits and
sites were challenges to McClellan's CERCLA
cleanup. Finally, we accept the district court's
determination that MESS's claims against the active
waste storage sites are not barred by Section 113(h).
We vacate the original judgment of the district
court and remand this matter to the district court with
instructions to dismiss MESS's claims relating to the
inactive sites for lack of jurisdiction, and to conduct
any further proceedings the district court deems
necessary or appropriate to resolve and enter final
judgment regarding MESS's claims relating to active
sites. Each party will bear its own costs.
VACATED AND REMANDED WITH
INSTRUCTIONS.
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94-1955 BOYD COUNTY, NEB. v. US ECOL-
OGY INC.
Disposal of low-level radioactive waste-Site se-
lection-Fraud-Res judicata-Federal juris-
diction.
Ruling below (CA 8, 48 F.3d 359):
Res judicata bars county's state law claims
against developer of low-level radioactive waste
disposal facility, alleging fraud and misrepresen-
tation in facility's site selection, that were assert-
ed in earlier actions by governor and state of
Nebraska seeking judicial review of site selection
in which it was determined that Nebraska's com-
munity consent-based challenge to site selection
was barred by limitations period under Central
Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Com-
pact, which is congressionally sanctioned multi-
state agreement designed to establish low-level
radioactive waste management system for certain
midwestern states; even though county itself was
not party to earlier suits, county's residents were
represented in those suits by state and governor,
and suits sought identical relief; accordingly, for
preclusion purposes, claims and plaintiffs are
same as in prior litigation; county's assertion that
diversity jurisdiction does not exist to justify fed-
eral court jurisdiction is immaterial, in light of
fact that claims present federal question within
subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts.
Questions presented: (1) Did lower courts err
in finding federal jurisdiction over county's fraud
lawsuit against respondent? (2) Is petitioner's
fraud lawsuit against respondent barred by res
judicata because of earlier lawsuit filed by State
of Nebraska seeking judicial review of adminis-
trative decision by Central Interstate Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Commission?
Petition for certiorari filed 5/25/95, by Patri-
cia A. Knapp, of Lincoln, Neb.
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NELSON SAYS PATIENCE NEEDED ON WASTE SITE
Governor Visits Four Boyd County Towns
The Omaha World-Herald Copyright 1995 Omaha World-Herald Company
Friday, July 28, 1995
Paul Hammel
World-Herald Staff Writer
In 1990, Ben Nelson told Boyd County residents
he would not allow a low-level radioactive waste
facility in their county unless it was proved safe.
Thursday, now-Gov. Nelson toured the county as
both supporters and opponents expressed frustration
that the fate of the controversial project has still not
been resolved.
Nelson urged patience during town hall meetings
in Naper, Butte, Spencer and Bristow.
"Tm normally not a patient person," he said. "But
as long as the system is working fairly and squarely
... that's the best we can hope for, regardless of how
we feel about the issue."
As Nelson spoke, state regulators and consultants
continued their review of a license for the $147
million project to decide if it can be safely operated.
That review and the planning process have cost more
than $63 million so far and may not be completed for
two more years.
Since 1988, when Boyd County was first picked
as a potential site, families, communities and church
congregations have been bitterly split over whether the
facility would mean a financial boost or environmental
ruin for the county.
Polite audiences in the four Boyd County towns
Thursday asked when a decision would finally be
made.
Nelson admitted he had few answers. He said his
administration has stayed out of the license-review
,process to ensure that it is not politically influenced.
But Nelson, responding to complaints by project
opponents, did say that construction might already be
completed if he hadn't raised questions about the
project.
"A lot of people thought it was a slam dunk," he
said. "Frustration (of opponents) is real and is not
unfounded. But the very reason they're frustrated
ought to be a reason for optimism - it hasn't been
built."
Opponents of the project - a few wearing "Save
Boyd County" buttons - did most of the talking at the
meetings, exept in Butte. They said that the site was
swampy and unsuitable, that they have been excluded
from project meetings in Lincoln and that they were
denied a promised vote on the facility.
Some just wanted the project to go away, asking
Nelson to withdraw from the five-state compact
developing the concrete-reinforced storehouse.
Lowell Fisher, a Spencer rancher who staged a
hunger strike in 1990 against the project, said his
14-year-old daughter had lived half her life with the
turmoil created by the proposal.
"I don't care about the technicalities," he said. "I
just want it out."
A crowd of about 175 people at the St. Mary
Catholic Church social hall in Spencer applauded.
Nelson said he has explored all options in pulling
out as the host state for the facility. He said he found
them to be too expensive because of likely lawsuits
and fines. Now it's up to regulators to decide whether
the site should be built, he said.
"Sometimes when things get off track it's hard to
get them back on. You almost have to run the course,"
Nelson said.
In Butte, the village whose town board has
consistently supported the project, Nelson received a
cordial reception. The board declared Thursday "Ben
Nelson Day" for his help in gaining an economic
development grant for a new water system in town and
a lottery grant to the Butte school for an interactive
video classroom program.
The waste project was barely mentioned at the
meeting at the Butte City Park. Instead, questions
centered on lowering property taxes, the new farm bill
and proposed federal cuts on Medicare for the elderly.
"I think he's done a good job despite our
disagreements," said Harold Reiser, chairman of the
Butte Village Board. "He's doing what he thinks is
right on the waste issue, just like we feel like we're
doing what's right."
The waste issue, Reiser said, is mostly out of
Nelson's hands. "It's up to the courts and government
(regulators) now," he said.
Others were not as kind. County Supervisor Lyle
Luber, who represents the area that includes the
proposed waste site, said Nelson's actions have unduly
delayed the project.
Nelson said he learned several things about
people's concerns during the meetings. He pledged to
get the Boyd County Local Monitoring Committee
included in future project meetings in Lincoln,
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promised to fight attempts to shorten public comment
opportunities on the license and push for a complete
audit of the Central Interstate Compact and its
contractor, US Ecology.
Some opponents called for the ouster of Richard
Coyne, an Omaha attorney who is Nebraska's
representative on the compact commission. They said
he had not pushed Nebraska's interests hard enough.
Nelson said he is continuing to push for two more
Nebraska representatives on the commission because,
he said, the job is more than one man can handle.
"Dick Coyne is a very able person. He has been
an objective, independent voice for the state," Nelson
said. "I support his independence even if I don't agree
with everything he says."
Dr. Charles Zidko, a Spencer dentist who is
co-chairman of Save Boyd County, an opponents'
group, said he was glad that Nelson visited the county,
if only to allow people to vent their frustrations.
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94-2001 WOODPOINTE INN ASSOCIATES
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP v. HARPER WOODS,
MICH.
Zoning-42 USC 1983-Federal jurisdiction-
"Shock the conscience" test.
Ruling below (CA 6, 3/7/95, unpublished):
Developers that sought to build hotel on vacant
commercial lot and eventually received from city
council special land use permit to do so, subject to
certain conditions, failed to show that city, by
denying dcvelopcrs' requests for extension of time
to begin construction, violated developers' sub-
stantive due process rights by acting in irrational
way that "shocks the conscience" of court; devel-
opers had alrcady been given longer time than
customary to begin construction under special
permit, and city's decision did not lack rational
basis.
Question presented: Should "shock the con-
science" test for invoking federal court jurisdic-
tion for substantive due process violations in land
use cases be followed, and should split of author-
ity among courts of appeals be resolved in favor
of one test?
Petition for certiorari filed 6/5/95, by Freder-
ick K. Hoops, and Hoops &, Hoops P.L.C., both
of Farmington Hills, Mich., Barbara J. Brown, of
Clarkston, Mich., and Lawrence R. Ternan, and
Beier Howlett P.C., both of Bloomfield Hills,
Mich.
94-1851 N & J COAL CO. v. U.S.
Government regulation of coal mining-Taking-
Compensation.
Ruling below (CA FC, 47 F.3d 1148, 63 LW
2523, 40 ERC 1353):
Mining company's acquisition of mineral sever-
ance rights by deed did not include right to
operate in manner that endangers public safety
and environment, and therefore government re-
strictions on company's nuisance-like activity-
specifically, extraction of coal that earlier opera-
tors had left in place, which caused surface subsi-
dence that resulted in large cracks in surface,
collapsing structures, and breaks in utility lines-
do not constitute compensable taking of property
under Fifth Amendment.
Questions presented: (1) Did actions of agents
of U.S. Dept. of Interior, Office of Surface Min-
ing, in requiring petitioners to leave in ground
coal that was otherwise commercially and eco-
nomically feasible to mine, and as to which peti-
tioners ad valid deeds, all necessary mining
rights, including right to subside private dwell.
ings, and state-issued mining permit, constitute
compensable regulatory taking under Fifth
Amendment? (2) Was determination by court
below that petitioners failed to establish cogniza-
ble property right to mine coal pursuant to state-
approved subsidence control plan and to subside
private dwellings clearly errorneous? (3) Does
government regulatory action purporting to pro-
tect public health and safety, which takes proper-
ty rights from owner and restores those rights to
citizen who had previously conveyed them, go too
far and, therefore, require payment of compensa-
tion, when citizen had ignored both actual and
constructive notice that owner's lawful mining
operation would cause subsidence.-to his house
and chose to remain on property? (4) Has federal
mine inspectors' regulatory action effectively de-
stroyed state-recognized estate in land, for which
petitioners arc entitled to compensation? (5)
Does decision of court below that no compensable
taking occurred conflict with applicable decisions
of this court?
Petition for certiorari filed 5/11/95, by Edgar
F. Heiskell IIL, of Charleston, W.Va.
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